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I. INTRODUCTION
Advancements in the internet have provided a growing medium for people to
publish and view original content.1 The cost of publication is at the lowest it has
ever been, and the amount of content available to internet users is at an all-time
high. However, the internet also provides an easy way to make unauthorized
copies of original works and share them with others.2 The internet industry,
content owners, and our legal system have experienced several growing pains in
an attempt to strike a balance between incentivizing technological advancements
in content production and publication while minimizing the ability or risk of
copyright infringement.3
An excellent example of this balancing act is the website YouTube and the
legal trouble it found itself in during its early days.4 Initially, big content owners
argued that YouTube’s website would destroy their industries because of how
easy it was for YouTube’s users to upload copyrighted works and many of these
content owners filed lawsuits.5 Even though YouTube prevailed in most of this
litigation, including a high-profile case against Viacom,6 the company still
implemented safeguards, such as its Content ID filter system,7 which reduced the
risk that its users would post infringing content. Moreover, YouTube has created
a Partnership Program (and recently made it available to everyone who uploads

1 See Edward Lee, Developing Copyright Practices for User-Generated Content, 13 J. INTERNET L. 1
(2009) (discussing how “technologies and platforms on the Internet . . . encourage users to engage,
create, and share content online . . .”).
2 See David Haskel, A Good Value Chain Gone Bad: Indirect Copyright Liability in Perfect 10 v. Visa,
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 405 (2008) (noting that “[i]n the digital age, anyone can make and
distribute copies instantaneously anywhere in the world at very little cost”).
3 See Brian Leubitz, Digital Millennium? Technological Protections for Copyright on the Internet, 11 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 417 (2003) (noting major litigation and congressional statutes in response to the
internet “revolutioniz[ing] the entertainment industry”).
4 See Kurt Hunt, Copyright and YouTube: Pirate’s Playground or Fair Use Forum?, 14 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH L. REV. 197, 202 (2007) (discussing the history of YouTube and some of the
copyright infringement claims filed against it); Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d
110 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
5 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at 5, Viacom Int’l Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-02103 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007) (arguing that “rampant infringement
will gravely undermine Plaintiffs and other companies that generate creative works, and will
threaten the livelihoods of those who work in and depend upon these companies”).
6 Viacom Int’l Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d at 110. Note that this case was appealed by Viacom, but the
two parties subsequently settled the suit. Peter Kafka, It’s Over! Viacom and Google Settle YouTube
Lawsuit, RECODE (Mar. 18, 2014, 6:38 AM), http://www.recode.net/2014/3/18/116246 56/itsover-viacom-and-google-settle-youtube-lawsuit.
7 See Nicholas Thomas DeLisa, You(Tube), Me, and Content ID: Paving the Way for Compulsory
Synchronization Licensing on User-Generated Content Platforms, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1275 (2016).
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content on its website)8 which provides content owners revenue based on the
number of views their videos receive.9 These efforts create an incentive for the
average person to create original content and upload it to the internet, which is
perfectly in line with the aims of copyright law.10 Therefore, it is fair to say that
YouTube, despite the fact that infringement still occurs on its website, is a success
story in reaching the balance between incentivizing original content production
and minimizing the risk of copyright infringement. However, other companies
have since entered the video sharing market.
Recently, the social media giant Facebook has developed its video player
interface to the point where it competes with YouTube in the number of video
views from its users.11 However, Facebook has not gone through the same
growing pains YouTube has and therefore does not have the same safeguards to
protect against the uploading and sharing of unauthorized videos.12 As a result,
many videos uploaded on Facebook are in fact stolen works from other users.13
This problem has been coined “freebooting” and has been publicized by many
original content owners who post their videos to YouTube or other websites.14
These content owners claim that Facebook has turned a blind eye to its users
uploading stolen content because Facebook is too busy reaping in the extra ad
revenue.15 Moreover, content owners complain that Facebook does not
8 See Stan Schroeder, YouTube Opens Partner Program to Everyone, MASHABLE (Apr. 13, 2012),
http://mashable.com/2012/04/13/youtube-opens-partner-program/#mTadIdshXZqR.
9 See Jennifer Beese, What is the YouTube Partner Program?, SPROUT SOCIAL (May 28, 2012),
http://sproutsocial.com/insights/how-to-youtube-partner-program/.
10 See Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 433 (2007)
(discussing the incentivizing aims of copyright law for authors to create and distribute their works).
11 See Dylan Tweney, Facebook is Nipping at YouTube’s Heels in the Race for Video Viewers and
Advertisers, VENTURE BEAT (June 22, 2015, 1:30 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2015/06/22/faceb
ook-is-nipping-at-youtubes-heels-in-the-race-for-video-viewers-and-advertisers/.
12 See Geoff Weiss, As Facebook Video Swells, YouTube Creators Cry Foul Over Copyright Infringement,
ENTREPRENEUR (June 5, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/247047 (noting
YouTube’s prior lawsuit with Viacom and its development of the Content ID system while
comparing that system to Facebook’s notice and take down policies where “the onus falls on
creators to hunt down stolen videos” (citing Evan DeSimone, Can YouTubers Protect Themselves from
Freebooting? Four Ways to Fight Back, NEW MEDIA ROCKSTARS (May 12, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://
newmediarockstars.com/2015/05/can-youtubers-protect-themselves-from-freebooting-four-way
s-to-fight-back/).
13 See Jason Abbruzzese, Many Videos of Facebook are Stolen, and Only Facebook Can Fix it,
MASHABLE (July 8, 2015, 4:03 PM), http://mashable.com/2015/07/08/facebook-video-theftproblem/#U86eWDgrkkqs.
14 See Will Oremus, Facebook’s Piracy Problem – Are Plagiarized YouTube Videos Helping Fuel the Social
Network’s Astonishing Video Growth?, SLATE (July 8, 2015, 11:44 AM), http://www.slate.
com/articles/technology/technology/2015/07/freebooting_stolen_youtube_videos_going_viral
_on_facebook.html.
15 See id. (noting that “YouTube personalities are convinced Facebook is profiting from
[freebooting] – at their expense”).
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cooperate with them in removing infringing videos.16 This problem, according
to content owners, has resulted in billions of unauthorized views of their works.17
Instead of having those views credited to them, the views are instead credited to
Facebook. This, of course, affects the content owners’ ad revenue, which is
dependent on the number of views they receive,18 and in turn, reduces the
incentive to create the original work in the first place.
Although freebooting is not exclusive to Facebook, this Note will examine
the issue, using Facebook as the focus. More specifically, this Note will analyze
the possible redress available to content owners if they were to bring a lawsuit
against the social media provider.19 To that end, this Note will explore whether
Facebook can be held indirectly liable for the freebooted videos uploaded to its
website by its users.
Part II of this Note will provide background information on copyright law as
it pertains to content owners and internet service providers, including a brief
synopsis of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1988 (DMCA). This section
will also discuss recent cases that have interpreted sections of DMCA and the
eligibility requirements for the immunity from liability the act provides.
Part III will explore the viability of a copyright infringement claim brought
by content owners against Facebook. This section will analyze Facebook’s
compliance (or lack thereof) with the DMCA and whether Facebook should
avoid indirect liability for its users’ infringement. This section will then use the
case law interpretations of the DMCA discussed in Part II to determine whether
a claim for copyright infringement is possible.
Finally, Part IV will conclude that a claim for indirect copyright infringement
against Facebook is possible, if not likely, given the analysis of its compliance
with the DMCA. This section will then conclude by suggesting to Facebook that
it implement more stringent safeguards against copyright infringement and

16 See Abbruzzese, supra note 13 (noting that a content owner sent over 200 notices to Facebook
regarding infringing videos on a fan page which have yet to be removed).
17 See Hank Green, Theft, Lies, and Facebook Video, MEDIUM (Aug. 2, 2015), https://medium.
com/@hankgreen/theft-lies-and-facebook-video-656b0ffed369#.p5fhmpv2u.
18 See Beese, supra note 9 (explaining how content owners monetize their content on YouTube
through video viewer advertisements).
19 It is worth noting that many individual claims that could be brought against Facebook for
copyright infringement may be small in terms of monetary value (unless that individual claimant
happens to own many copyrighted works that have been “freebooted” on Facebook’s website).
Therefore, individual copyright holders may strategically pursue a class action lawsuit against
Facebook for indirect copyright infringement. However, there may be several difficulties associated
with different content owners bringing a class action for copyright infringement, and that
discussion is outside the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note will only look at the viability of an
individual’s claim of copyright infringement against Facebook.
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update its take-down procedures to be more effective in order to avoid losing its
safe harbor protections.
II. BACKGROUND
A. AN OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS IT PERTAINS TO INTERNET SERVICE
PROVIDERS (ISP)20

Congress is given the power to create copyright protections by Article 1,
Section 8 of the United States Constitution.21 Congress has used this power to
create copyright statutes that give content owners exclusive rights to their original
works22 which include the right to reproduce the work in a copy.23 When another
person violates this right (or any other exclusive right in § 106), the statute makes
them liable as an infringer.24
To bring a claim for copyright infringement, the claimant must show “(1)
ownership of a valid copyright and (2) copying of constituent elements of the
work that are original.”25 In addition, there also exists a statutory fair use defense
to copyright infringement.26 Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides that:
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106 and 106(A), the
fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include
— (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.27
“[W]hen considering the purpose and character of a use, courts generally ask two
questions: whether the use is for a commercial purpose and whether the use is
20 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) defines a service provider as “a provider of online services or network
access, or the operator of facilities therefor. . . .”
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
22 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
23 Id. § 106.
24 Id. § 910.
25 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (citing Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985)).
26 17 U.S.C. § 107.
27 Id.
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transformative.”28 Uses that are for commercial purposes generally weigh against
a finding of fair use while uses that are transformative, those that add expressive
qualities to the original work, generally weigh in favor of such a finding.29
However, none of the factors in § 107 are determinative and “each must be
weighed in relation to the other factors in a particular case.”30
Additionally, copyright holders are not limited to claims against those directly
responsible for copyright infringement as they can also bring vicarious or
contributory infringement claims.31 A claim for vicarious copyright infringement
“extends beyond an employer/employee relationship to cases in which a
defendant ‘has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also
had direct financial interest in such activities.’ ”32 A claim for contributory
infringement liability “requires that the secondary infringer ‘know or have reason
to know’ of direct infringement”33 and “ ‘induce[ ], cause[ ] or materially
contribute[ ] to the infringing conduct of another.’ ”34
Copyright holders can also bring an action for the inducement of copyright
infringement.35 “To establish a claim for inducement, a plaintiff must show that
the defendant (1) engaged in purposeful conduct that encouraged copyright
infringement, with (2) the intent to encourage such infringement.”36 Further “[a]
defendant’s intent to foster infringement can be established by evidence of the
defendant’s ‘clear expression’ of such an intent, or of ‘affirmative steps [the
defendant has] taken to foster infringement.’ ”37
These indirect theories of copyright infringement posed a serious threat to
the development and advancement of the internet since the technology has made
“copying and disseminating works around the world incredibly easy, [and] on a
scale previously unimaginable.”38 In response to this problem, Congress passed
the DMCA in an “attempt to update copyright law to keep pace with

28 Tara M. Warrington, Harry Potter and the Doctrine of Fair Use: Conjuring a New Copyright Complaint,
10 FLA. COSTAL L. REV. 621, 627 (2009) (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
578–79 (1994)).
29 Id. at 627 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 585).
30 Id. (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577–78).
31 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that plaintiffs
brought an action for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement).
32 Id. at 1022 (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996)).
33 Id. at 1020 (quoting Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829,
845–46 (11th Cir. 1990)).
34 Id. at 1019 (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artist Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
35 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005).
36 Arista Records, LLC. v. Lime Group LLC., 784 F. Supp. 398, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
37 Id. (quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937 (2005)).
38 Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 233, 233 (2009).
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[technological advances of] the internet.”39 The act created several safe harbors
from liability under copyright law for internet service providers.40 One of these
safe harbor provisions limits liability for “information residing on systems or
networks at the direction of users.”41 This section states in relevant part that:
(1) In general. – A service provider shall not be liable . . . for
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction
of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled
or operated by or for the service provider if the service provider –
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an
activity using the material on the system or network is
infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such knowledge, is not aware of facts
or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent;
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to
the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider
has the right and ability to control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement . . . responds
expeditiously to remove, or disable assess to, the material
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing
activity.42
Additionally, section (i), entitled “conditions for eligibility,” of the DMCA
states that:
The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply to
a service provider only if the service provider –
(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs
subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s
system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination
in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account
holders of the service provider’s system or network who are
39 Id. See also Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 114 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (stating that the “DMCA was enacted because service providers perform a useful function,
but the great volume of works placed by outsiders on their platforms . . . might well contain
copyright-infringing material . . .”).
40 Lee, supra note 38, at 235–36.
41 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012).
42 Id. § 512(c)(1).
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repeat infringers; and (B) accommodates and does not interfere
with standard technical measures.43
Based upon this safe harbor provision, ISPs can avoid liability for its users’
copyright infringement if the ISP meets the several statutory requirements listed
above. If, however, the ISP does not abide by the requirements of the provision,
it loses the immunity afforded to it by the Act and could face indirect liability for
copyright infringement.44
B. VIACOM INTERNATIONAL V. YOUTUBE

In 2007, content owner Viacom International brought suit against YouTube
for copyright infringement “based upon approximately 79,000 video clips
appearing on the YouTube website.”45 The district court found that YouTube
was protected by the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions and the case was appealed
to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.46 On appeal, the circuit court interpreted
the DMCA to determine (among other things): (1) what level of knowledge is
required by § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)–(iii); (2) whether the common law doctrine of willful
blindness could be used to establish that knowledge; and (3) the meaning of
“ability and control” as used in § 512(c)(1)(B).47
As for the first issue, the circuit court held that § 512(c)(1)(a)(i) “turns on
whether the provider actually or ‘subjectively’ knew of specific infringement,
while [§ 512(c)(1)(a)(ii)] [ ] turns on whether the provider was subjectively aware
of facts that would have made the specific infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to
a reasonable person.”48 Further, the court stated that “[b]oth provisions [(a)(i)
and (a)(ii)] do independent work, and both apply only to specific instances of
43 Id. § 512(i)(1). See generally id. § 512(i)(2) (providing a definition of the term “standard technical
measures” as used in section 512(i)(1)).
44 See Capitol Records, LLC. v. Escape Media Group, Inc., No. 12-CV-6646 (AJN), 2015 WL
1402049, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2015) (noting that for a service provider to “qualify for any of
the DMCA safe harbors, the service provider must first satisfy the ‘conditions for eligibility’
described in 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) . . .”); Viacom, 676 F.3d at 26 (noting that “[t]he § 512(c) safe harbor
will apply only if the service provider [abides by the requirements of that section]”). Seventeen
U.S.C. § 512(m) “provides that safe harbor protection shall not be conditioned on ‘a service
provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity, except
to the extent consistent with a standard technical measure complying with the provisions of
subsection (i).’ ” Viacom, 676 F.3d at 35 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)).
45 Jack C. Schecter, Is it Safe? The Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s “Safe Harbor” in the Wake of
Viacom v. YouTube, 59-AUG FED. LAW. 16 (2012).
46 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 26 (citing Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529
(S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
47 Id. at 26, 41–42.
48 Id. at 31.
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infringement.”49 After making these interpretations, the circuit court affirmed
the district court’s holding that “actual knowledge or awareness of facts or
circumstances that indicate specific and identifiable instances of infringement will
disqualify a service provider from the safe harbor.”50 Therefore, all knowledge
requirements in § 512(c)(1)(A) only refer to “specific and identifiable” infringing
activities and thus general knowledge that infringement is occurring does not
remove an ISP from the protections of the safe harbor.51
Regarding the second issue, the circuit court held that “the willful blindness
doctrine may be applied, in appropriate circumstances, to demonstrate
knowledge or awareness of specific instances of infringement under the
DMCA.”52 However, the court did note that section 512(m) denies any
affirmative duty on an ISP to monitor for infringing activity but that the “willful
blindness [doctrine] cannot be defined as an affirmative duty to monitor.”53 In
other words, “willful blindness . . . entail[s] a purposeful avoidance of knowledge
of specific instances of infringement” but does not create a duty to monitor for
infringing activity.54 The circuit court went on to remand back to the district
court the question of whether YouTube “made a ‘deliberate effort to avoid guilty
knowledge.’ ”55
Lastly, for the ability and control issue, the circuit court rejected the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation of section 512(c)(1)(B) that the ability and control
language requires specific knowledge of infringing activities because such an
interpretation would render section 512(c)(1)(A) superfluous.56 Instead, the
Second Circuit held that the “ ‘right and ability to control’ infringing activity
under § 512(c)(1)(B) ‘requires something more than the ability to remove or block
access to materials posted on a service provider’s website.’ ”57 The court noted
the difficulty in defining what constitutes “something more” but gave two
examples and said that both “involve[d] a service provider exerting substantial
influence on the activities of users, without necessarily — or even frequently —
acquiring knowledge of specific infringing activity.”58 Commentators have
Id. at 32.
Id.
51 Schecter, supra note 45, at 16 (stating that Second Circuit “rejected Viacom’s argument that
generalized awareness of infringing activity is sufficient to oust an ISP from the safe harbor”).
52 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 35.
53 Id.
54 Schecter, supra note 45, at 17.
55 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 35 (citing In re Aimster, 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003)).
56 Id. at 36.
57 Id. at 38 (quoting Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC., 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 645
(S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
58 Id. One of the examples given by the court came from Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc.,
213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal 2002) where the “service provider instituted a monitoring program
49
50

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2018

9

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 8

324

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 25:2

described the examples given by the Second Circuit as “suggest[ing] that
something much more than the ability to block access is required” and that “[a]s
long as an [ISP] is not purposefully and actively inserting itself in dictating the
content of the materials of its users, it seems unlikely it would forfeit safe harbor
protection by reason of the right and ability to control.”59
The case was remanded to the district court who then found that: Viacom
lacked proof that YouTube had knowledge of any specific infringement;
YouTube was not willfully blind to any specific instances of infringements; and
that YouTube did not have the right and ability to control infringing activities
from its users as defined by section 512(c)(1)(B).60 Viacom appealed that ruling
but the case was settled before the second appeal was heard.61
III. VIABILITY OF A COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CLAIM AGAINST FACEBOOK
A. DIRECT COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

Since Facebook is not directly responsible for the freebooting on its website,
any copyright infringement claim against it must arise under a secondary theory
of liability.62 “It is well-established that ‘[s]econdary liability for copyright
infringement does not exist in the absence of direct infringement. . . .’ ”63
Therefore, a claimant must first establish whether a Facebook user who freeboots
someone else’s video could be held directly liable for copyright infringement.
This inquiry is fairly straightforward assuming the video uploaded to
Facebook is an exact copy of the original video. As noted above, a claimant for
copyright infringement must show “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2)
copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.”64 An exact copy
satisfies the second element,65 so the only question is whether such a video is

[and gave] detailed instructions [to its users and] refused access to [those] users who failed to
comply with its instructions.” Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38. The other example came from Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) which involved a service provider inducing
copyright infringement from its users.
59 Schecter, supra note 45, at 23.
60 Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
61 Id., appeal withdrawn, No. 13-1720 (2d Cir. Mar. 19, 2014).
62 For the purposes of this Note, we are only looking at examples of freebooting that arose from
a Facebook user who uploaded someone else’s video on Facebook’s website. The Note does not
assess whether or not Facebook itself have uploaded such videos to its own website.
63 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC., 718 F.3d 1006, 1031 (9th Cir. 2013)
(quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001)).
64 Feist, 499 U.S. at 361.
65 It is worth noting that if the video is not an exact copy, this Note would have to address what
elements of the video were taken and whether those elements were original. See Harper & Row,
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copyrightable. For a work to be copyrightable, it must have been created by the
author and possess “at least some minimal degree of creativity.”66 This required
“level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.”67
Therefore, content owners could likely meet the required showing for direct
copyright infringement.
Of course, Facebook could argue that the use of the copied videos by its users
is protected by the fair use defense of section 107. However, assuming the videos
are exact copies, this defense likely fails. Since the videos would be completely
duplicative, they would not add any additional expression. Thus, the use of these
videos would not be transformative.68 Additionally, when courts find that a use
of a copyrighted work is not transformative, they typically rule against the
application of section 107 if the use is also commercial.69 While some Facebook
users only use the website for personal, noncommercial activities, others who use
it promote their businesses or other commercial activity.70 Therefore, content
owners likely have a viable claim for direct copyright infringement against
Facebook users who upload exact copies of their videos on Facebook pages that
include some commercial activity.
B. INDIRECT THEORIES OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY

Assuming that freebooted videos likely constitute direct copyright
infringement, the inquiry turns to whether Facebook could be held liable under
a secondary theory of liability.
One theory of secondary infringement a content owner may wish to pursue
against Facebook is contributory infringement. As noted above, a claimant for
contributory copyright infringement must show that the secondary infringer had
actual or constructive knowledge of the direct infringement and that the
secondary infringer either induced, caused, or materially contributed to the
infringement.71 It is unlikely Facebook has actual knowledge of any specific
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). However, such an inquiry is outside the
scope of this Note.
66 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
67 Id.
68 See Warrington, supra note 28, at 627.
69 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (N.D.
Ca. 1995) (“Where the use is not highly transformative, as here, the court will focus on whether the
use is of a commercial nature.” (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584
(1994))).
70 For example, Facebook allows for the creation of “pages” to promote companies or raise
brand awareness. See Kyli Singh, What’s Really the Difference Between Facebook Pages, Groups and Profiles?,
MASHABLE (Oct. 19, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/10/19/facebook-pages-groupsprofiles/#Lc.6Atin0iqB.
71 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2001).
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instances of freebooting on its website, so the question becomes whether it had
reason to know that its users are freebooting other people’s copyrighted videos.
The Supreme Court has held that “the sale of copying equipment . . . does not
constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes . . .,” or, indeed is “merely capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.”72 Since Facebook can be used for a wide range of purposes
that do not result in copyright infringement,73 it is very unlikely a claimant can
establish Facebook had constructive knowledge of any copyright infringement
occurring on its website. Therefore, a contributory copyright infringement claim
against Facebook is unlikely to succeed.74
The next theory of indirect copyright infringement a claimant may wish to
pursue against Facebook is the inducement theory. As indicated above, a
claimant must show that the defendant has intentionally engaged in conduct that
encouraged copyright infringement.75 It has been held that “[d]irect evidence of
inducement is an ‘advertisement or solicitation that broadcasts a message
designed to stimulate others to commit violations.’ ”76 However, establishing this
theory of liability against Facebook appears to be difficult.
Although, apparently by design, Facebook seems to prioritize videos uploaded
to its website over other videos that are posted as links (which makes the former
appear more frequently to other users),77 it does not appear that Facebook has
encouraged users to upload other people’s videos as opposed to the user
uploading their own videos. However, one could argue that Facebook has
intentionally prioritized uploaded videos over links knowing a significant portion
of the uploaded videos will be infringed copies of original works. Moreover, a
content owner could argue that such freebooted videos keep users on Facebook’s
website longer (as opposed to links which might result in users leaving the website
to find the original source), leading to more ad revenue.78 This argument has its
challenges, though, and appears to rely on speculation as to what Facebook’s

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
See Daniel Nations, What is Facebook?, LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-facebo
ok-3486391 (last updated Oct. 4, 2016).
74 See Arista Records, LLC. v. Lime Group LLC., 784 F. Supp. 398, 433–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(applying the Sony-Betamax rule and determining if the defendant’s internet service was capable of
substantial non-infringing for the purposes of assessing plaintiff’s contributory infringement claim).
75 Id. at 425 (quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936–37).
76 Id. (quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937).
77 Brent Csutoras, Videos on Facebook: Native vs YouTube. Which Wins?, SEARCH ENGINE J. (June
29, 2015), https://www.searchenginejournal.com/videos-facebook-native-vs-youtube-wins/1343
89/.
78 See Green, supra note 17 (arguing the unfairness of Facebook’s approach to video content).
72
73

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol25/iss2/8

12

Tait: Freebooting on Facebook -- Should the Social Media Giant Face Lia

2018]

FREEBOOTING ON FACEBOOK

327

intentions were in creating its video player interface. For these reasons, it seems
unlikely a claimant would prevail on an inducement theory of liability.79
The last theory of secondary liability a content owner may want to pursue is
the vicarious liability theory. As noted above, a claimant must show that the
defendant receives a financial benefit from the direct infringement and that the
defendant had the right and ability to control such infringing activity.80 It has
been held that “[f]inancial benefit exists where the availability of infringing
material ‘acts as a “draw” for customers.’ ”81 Since Facebook receives ad revenue
based on its users’ activity on its website,82 and since having creative video
content on its website encourages more user interaction,83 a claimant should have
no trouble establishing that Facebook receives financial benefit from freebooted
videos.
As for the ability and control showing, the claimant must establish that
Facebook had the ability to control the user’s infringing activities but neglected
to do so.84 Since Facebook’s Terms of Service state that “[the user] will not post
content or take any action on Facebook that infringes or violates someone else’s
rights or otherwise violates the law” and the “[w]e can remove any content or
information you post on Facebook if we believe that it violates this Statement or
our policies,”85 a claimant should be able to establish that Facebook had the right
and ability to control (by removing) a user’s freebooted videos. Additionally, if
the freebooted videos have not been removed, the claimant can establish that
Facebook failed to exercise this control. Based on these circumstances, a claim
for vicarious liability is likely to succeed86 (except for possible defenses which are
discussed below).

79 See GlobalOptions Servs., Inc. v. N. Am. Training Grp., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1300
(M.D. Fla. 2015) (“Bare legal conclusions are not sufficient and NATG must state more factual
allegations in support [of its inducement claim].”). It is worth pointing out that once a content
owner files suit, they can take advantage of the discovery rules to acquire more facts that may
provide insight into Facebook’s intentions when designing its video player interface.
80 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fonovisa,
Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996)).
81 Id. at 1023 (quoting Fonovisa, 76 F.3d. at 263–64).
82 See Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Revenue Soars on Ad Growth, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2016, 12:59
AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-revenue-soars-on-ad-growth-1461787856
(discussing ad-generated revenue increases).
83 See Tim Peterson, Facebook’s Strategy to Take on YouTube Comes into View, ADVERTISINGAGE
(Sept. 9, 2014), http://adage.com/article/digital/facebook-s-biggest-weapon-youtube-algorithm/
294873/ (discussing Facebook’s efforts to generate more revenue and views form video content).
84 Arista Records, LLC. v. Lime Group LLC., 784 F. Supp. 398, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
85 See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.facebook.
com/legal/terms.
86 See Lime Group, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 435–36.
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C. SAFE HARBOR DEFENSE

Regardless of which indirect theory of copyright infringement is brought
against it, Facebook will undoubtedly raise the DMCA safe harbor defense. The
most applicable safe harbor provision for freebooted videos posted on Facebook
by its users is 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), which limits liability for copyrighted information
residing on systems or network resulting from the direction of users. As
discussed above, there are certain requirements an ISP must meet to take
advantage of this safe harbor listed under § 512(c) and § 512(i).
As for the first requirement of § 512(c)(A)(i), and as previously mentioned, it
is very unlikely that Facebook has actual knowledge of specific instances of
infringing activity occurring on its website.87 Therefore, we can move straight to
the second requirement, whether Facebook is “aware of facts or circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent.”88 But as pointed out above,
interpretations of this requirement have made it very difficult to show that an ISP
“was subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific infringement
‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable person.”89 Facebook can easily argue that
just because infringement is possible on its video player interface and that some
people have used it for that purpose in the past, these facts do not make specific
infringement obvious. Therefore, Facebook likely meets the second requirement.
As for the third requirement, under § 512(c)(a)(iii), whether Facebook
expeditiously removes infringing content, Facebook can point to 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(m) that states that an ISP does not have to monitor its website for
infringing activity.90 However, that section provides an exception to that rule to
the extent that such monitoring is consistent with the standard technical measure
requirement of § 512(i).91 Here, a content owner can argue that since Facebook
does not have any filter process that prevents the uploading of infringing material,
it has not complied with § 512(i). To further advance this argument, a content
owner can show that other video player websites have implemented such filter
systems, such as YouTube’s content ID system. By pointing to other ISPs that
have implemented these filters, the content owners can argue that they have
become a “standard technical measure.” Even though, there does not appear to
be much case law on what exactly is a standard technical measure, it seems likely
that Congress intended the term to adapt to future technological advances in the
internet industry. Therefore, it is plausible that a filter system could fit the
definition.
87
88
89
90
91

See id. at 433–34.
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).
17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (2012).
Id.
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Additionally, a content owner can point to the fact that searching Facebook
for specific infringing videos is much more difficult than other video player
websites, like YouTube.92 Thus the claimant can argue that Facebook’s interface
interferes with and does not accommodate searching mechanisms that have also
become “standard technical measures.” These arguments on what constitutes a
standard technical measure will certainly require expert testimony, but by showing
that YouTube has implemented these safeguards,93 it makes the argument that
they have become standard technical measure more likely. Therefore, based on
these reasons, Facebook could potentially lose safe harbor protection for
violations of § 512(i).
As for the fourth requirement under § 512(c)(B), whether Facebook receives
financial benefit from infringement with the ability to control it, this Note has
already established that Facebook does receive financial benefit from the
freebooted videos with the ability to control the infringing activity. However, in
the context of the DMCA, courts have added additional requirements. As noted
above, the Ninth Circuit requires that the ISP have specific knowledge of the
infringing activities.94 The Second Circuit rejects that interpretation but still
requires “something more” than the mere ability to control the infringing
activity.95 Since Facebook would not have specific knowledge of the
infringement, it would not lose its safe harbor protection in the Ninth Circuit.
Additionally, since it appears that the Second Circuit requires something “much
more” than the mere ability to control,96 it also seems unlikely Facebook would
lose protection under this interpretation. Therefore, Facebook is likely to
establish its compliance with § 512(c)(B).
As for the final requirement, under § 512(c)(C), whether Facebook acts
expeditiously to remove infringing activity once it receives a notification,
Facebook can point to its Copyright Report Form and policies regarding its takedown procedure.97 Nevertheless, as some content owners have pointed out, a
claimant can argue that even with this procedure, Facebook is not acting
“expeditiously.”98 However, commentators have noted the lack of case law and
direction as to what constitutes “expeditiously” as well as the wide range of time
See Green, supra note 17.
See DeLisa, supra note 7.
94 UMG Recording, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011),
withdrawn, 718 F.3d 1006 (2013).
95 Schecter, supra note 45, at 17.
96 Id.
97 Copyright Report Form, FACEBOOK (2016), https://www.facebook.com/help/contact/140969
7672616547.
98 Paul Tamburro, h3h3productions Exposes Facebook’s Awful Approach to Stolen Videos, CRAVE (Dec.
16, 2016), http://www.craveonline.com/design/934513-h3h3productions-exposes-facebo oksawful-approach-stolen-videos.
92
93
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frames that have withstood the test.99 Therefore, the resolution of this question
will likely be case specific100 and may result in different outcomes depending on
which content owner brings suit and their specific interactions with Facebook.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given Facebook’s lack of safeguards and protections to prevent copyright
infringement from occurring on its website, it may be in danger of losing its
DMCA safe harbor protections and could be subject to indirect liability.
However, Facebook does have an argument that it has met the requirements of
the DMCA and therefore should not face liability. But even if that is the case,
Facebook should still take YouTube’s example and implement safeguards
regardless. If it does not, it could scare away content creators that would
ultimately help the ISP in its competition with other video player websites. For
these reasons, Facebook should implement a filter system similar to YouTube’s
Content ID system that would aid in the prevention of users uploading infringing
videos. Moreover, by addressing the issue of freebooting, Facebook could
restore the proper balance between technological advancement and incentivizing
content creation that copyright law aims to achieve.

99 Darin M. Klemchuck & Ryan Jones, How Quickly do Internet Companies Need to Take Content Down
Following a DMCA Notice?, 18 No. 10 J. INTERNET L. 1, 37–38 (2015).
100 Id. at 37 (citing S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44 (1998)).
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